


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OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR:
How Effective Is Our Unity of Effort?


by

William H. Millward
CDR, USN



A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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Paper directed by CAPTAIN Dave Watson, USN
Chairman, Department of Joint Operations

Approved by:


CAPT Steve Wesselhoff, USN
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ABSTRACT
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How Effective Is Our Unity of Effort?

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CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION

These words from the Secretary of Defense 1994 Annual Report to the President and Congress capture the essence of change that we, as a nation, are trying to fathom and come to terms with; a process that will take time.

With this new security environment portending smaller and more numerous threats, inter-agency unity of effort assumes an ever expanding role of importance in the development and implementation of national policy for operations other than war (OOTW).²

The military's role in this inter-agency effort must remain supportive of national objectives, yet be prepared to articulate the cost of intractable conflict. There are several voices within the Department of Defense (DoD) who contribute to the military's involvement in developing and implementing OOTW policy. One significant member is the combatant commander.*

The combatant commander will either lead or support other agencies in accomplishing missions designed to implement national

"Today's security environment holds no single threat compelling enough to dictate basic strategy, as it did with containment, or to drive defense planning and military doctrine. Now potential threats are smaller and numerous, but they still threaten the nation's security. It is difficult to know when these threats will emerge, thus making it much more difficult to determine whether, when, or how to use force in coping with these new dangers."

* Combatant commanders are regional commanders-in-chief (CINCs). This paper uses the terms combatant commander, operational commander, unified commander, commander, and CINC interchangeably without loss of meaning.

policy. In either situation, it is essential that the capabilities of each agency are used to their greatest potential and fashioned constructively to produce a single synergistic government force.

To effectively merge the military's expertise with other agencies's attributes, the commander must actively pursue positive coordination efforts between his staff and the other government organizations with whom he is working. This is not necessarily an easy task, as there exist many obstacles to unity of effort.

Purpose

Commanders must vigilantly work at overcoming unity barriers to ally government efforts. This paper examines three potential hurdles to unity of effort between the Departments of Defense and State during OOTW: 1) organizational structure and linkages between the two departments; 2) assigned agency responsibilities for the various categories of OOTW; and, 3) the differences in organizational personality types which ultimately determine how each department operates.

In assessing these three barriers, I will first highlight each department's OOTW organizational structure. This presentation will show that much work has already been accomplished to physically connect the two organizations. Second, at the country team/regional level, I will contrast the Ambassador's assigned duties with those of the unified commander's. This comparison makes clear primary mission

responsibilities. Finally, I will examine the differences between Defense and State Department personality types, and reveal why their dissimilarity is key to understanding why unity of effort is difficult to preserve.

Assumptions

A complete discussion of unity of effort between State and Defense is, at times, difficult due to unity's dependence on several variable and complex interactions. To limit this paper, I will make the following assumptions:

- 1) the United States will remain a major influence in promoting regional stability;
- 2) U.S. budgetary constraints will be influential in the prioritization of resources to regions of concern;
- 3) regional situations will remain complex in nature, as suggested by Todd Greentree in "The United States and the Politics of Conflict in the Developing World: A Policy Study," a world shaped by internal and external area factors;³
- 4) key to regional stability, as proposed by Ambassador Paul Taylor in, "Whither Hemispheric Trade?," is a functioning democratic system of government which is supported by free trade and integrated economies;⁴
- 5) regional conflicts grow out of local discontinuities and dissatisfactions. It is better, according to Joint Pub 3-07, to attempt conflict resolution at the area level;⁵
- 6) the U.S. government cannot necessarily unilaterally resolve area conflicts through the application of external resources or regional programs. A market system, as also stated by Ambassador Taylor, is a "preferred tool."⁶

CHAPTER II UNITY OF EFFORT

Unity of effort between governmental agencies during operations other than war is dependent on organizational structure, delegated responsibility, and the people who are assigned to those agencies. Senator Henry Jackson conducted hearings as early as July 1963 on organizational coordination problems between federal agencies. His hearings on "The Ambassador and the Problem of Coordination" chronicled formal studies and Executive Orders dating to 1942, and concluded that coordination was a considerable issue that needed resolution.⁷ In reviewing Senator Jackson's report, it is apparent that some coordination difficulties have been ameliorated through his proposed "Central Partnership" of interagency linkage and cooperation.

In today's new security environment, interagency harmony continues to gain momentum. For example, unity of effort is at the top of the State Department's organizational priority in

State 2000: A New Model For Managing Foreign Affairs:

"First we must integrate our foreign policy...Our foreign policy grows lengthier by the day and, with it, the number of actors within the U.S. Government and outside it. Without a truly integrated approach, we run the risk of incoherent, even contradictory policy."⁸

The Department of Defense places a likewise high priority on unity, as highlighted in the 1994 Annual Defense Report:

"SOF face two major challenges: they must integrate with conventional forces, other U.S. agencies, friendly foreign forces and other international organizations, while preserving an element of autonomy necessary to protect and encourage the unconventional approach that is the soul of special operations."⁹

Better defined duties and responsibilities also support Senator Jackson's suggested improvements. What has not been clearly articulated in law has been formally agreed to by the two departments.

As mentioned previously, unity of effort between the Defense and State Departments is influenced by those individuals assigned to the respective organizations. When considering what motivates professionals, I believe four factors must be considered:

1) leadership from the top; 2) professional treatment and recognition - respect; 3) varied and challenging assignments; and, 4) potential for advancement.

The American people have, for the most part, been well served by the capable leadership of past and present Secretaries of State and Defense. The nation receives an added benefit of economy and efficiency through unity when the two Secretaries share a close personal and professional relationship.

Demonstrating this unifying relationship was the Rusk - McNamara team during the Kennedy/Johnson Administrations (1961 - 1968). From an organizational perspective, the most significant gains in inter-departmental relations were made during this era.¹⁰ Colonel George Robinson reinforces in, "Programs for Improved Politico-Military Capabilities in the State Department," the distinguishing characteristics of a close Secretarial affiliation include: "1) the range and substance of the effort is far greater than is superficially recognized; 2) coordination is constantly growing, changing and improving; and, 3) there is a

marked increase in mutual understanding and appreciation for the views and concerns held by the professionals at both ends of Memorial Bridge."¹¹

Recognition of professional capabilities also influences organizational motivation. General George Joulwan, while serving as CINCUSOUTHCOM, motivated his team when he openly promoted contributions by knowledgeable and experienced agency professionals in accomplishing national policy objectives in the USSOUTHCOM area. "Common understanding and commitment of purpose, which I call clarity and focus, by all U.S. agencies provide(d) the synergistic effect to achieve U.S. national policy goals in USSOUTHCOM's area of responsibility."¹² In this case, ongoing operations in Central America were of such importance to both Defense and State Department officials, that staffs actively worked closely together.¹³

With the foregone discussion serving as an introduction to the three obstacles to unity of effort, I shall now more closely examine Defense and State organizational structure.

Organizational Structure

The State Department's OOTW organizational structure has evolved over time. Following World War II, General George C. Marshall, while serving as Secretary of State, initiated two programs to improve the Department's operations. First, the Executive Secretariat was reorganized to improve document and information flow to the Secretary. Second, a policy and planning

staff was formed to develop long-term programs to achieve U.S. foreign policy objectives.¹⁴ These efforts served as the impetus for permanent department change.

In concert with State's efforts, the Defense Department in 1950 appointed a special assistant for international security affairs. This assistant was tasked with not only coordinating actions within the department, but also with State.

The most significant strides in coupling the two organizations were made in the 1960's under Secretaries Rusk and McNamara. Several initiatives, backed by formal memorandums of understanding and terms of reference, were carried out, including the following eight that remain with us today:

- 1) periodic policy coordination meetings were established between State, Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff;
- 2) regional politico-military conferences commenced between State and Defense officials from senior Washington levels through area and regional levels;
- 3) the National Military Command Center (NMCC) and newly formed State Department Operations Center (OPCEN) were linked through staff transfers and improved telecommunications;
- 4) officer exchange programs were initiated between the two departments;
- 5) State Department political advisors were assigned to CINC staffs;
- 6) the position of politico-military advisor was established on the country team;
- 7) a senior defense attache to coordinate activities of all defense attaches was assigned to the Defense Department;
- 8) exchange of instructors and students among the various military colleges and later between the Foreign Service Institute.¹⁵

Continuing in the 1970's and 1980's, only incremental progress was made to better unite the two departments. As a separate initiative aimed countering DoD's reluctance to form the Special Operations Command (rather than through any intentional effort on behalf of Defense and State) Congress established through Title 50 - War and National Defense, §402(g), "The Board for Low Intensity Conflict" to coordinate the policies of the U.S. for such conflicts. Composed of representatives from Defense, State, Treasury, Commerce, Justice, CIA, Director of Central Intelligence, and U.S. Information Agency (USIS), the benefits of the Board in its advisory role to the National Security Council, could be substantial. Unfortunately, for no clear reason, this Board has never been formed.¹⁶

Faced with a new security environment and declining budgets, the U.S. agencies in the 1990's have, once again, displayed a renewed interest in unity of effort. Figure (1), below, presents the current organizational structure supporting this effort.¹⁷

There are three organizational levels depicted in Figure (1): national; agency; and, regional/country. At the national level, the President and the Secretary of Defense - forming the National Command Authority - combine with the Vice-President, Secretary of State and other major agencies - together in the National Security Council.¹⁸

At the agency level, regional policies are formulated and issues are staffed for consideration at the national level. Here, the Defense Department's Under-Secretary of Defense for




Figure 1. Departments of Defense and State OOTW Organization

Policy with his various Assistant Secretaries, and the Joint Staff work together with the State Department's four primary Under-Secretaries to coordinate national policy details.¹⁹

The regional combatant commander and country team organization level is where the "rubber meets the road" and national policy is executed. Close coordination at this level is essential to ensure assigned missions are properly carried out. Additionally, feedback to the higher levels is paramount in keeping the Administration informed of the latest local developments and adapting policy to local conditions.

In summary, the tie between the Defense and State organizations has evolved from the early 1950's when General George C. Marshall, while serving as Secretary of State, initiated programs to improve that department's operational capability. During the 1960's, the close relationship between Dean Rusk and Robert McNamara produced most of the inter-departmental connections we enjoy today. While the 1970's and 1980's yielded only incremental improvements, the 1990's, confronted with a new security environment and declining budget, has prompted renewed unity of effort discussions between Defense and State.

The next barrier to unity of effort that I will review is the potential conflict between the Ambassador and unified commander in their assignment of duties and responsibilities.

Duties and Responsibilities

National and Agency level responsibilities for operations other than war are well defined by law. For example Title 50 - War and National Defense, delineates responsibilities for members of the National Security Council, and Title 10 - Armed Forces and Title 22 - Foreign Relations and Intercourse, respectively, detail the organizational makeup, duties and responsibilities for the Departments of Defense and State.

At the country team level, Ambassadors are assigned their responsibilities by a "President's Letter to Ambassadors." The following excerpt from a letter sent by President Bush to all

Ambassadors during his term, highlights the Ambassador's responsibilities:

"As commander in chief, I retain authority over United States armed forces. On my behalf you have responsibility for the direction, coordination, supervision, and safety, including security from terrorism, of all Department of Defense personnel on official duty in (country)/at (international organization), except those personnel under the command of a U.S. area military commander."²⁰

In contrast, the combatant commander's duties and responsibilities are defined under Title 10, § 164:

"... responsible to the President and to the Secretary of Defense for the performance of missions assigned to that command by the President or by the Secretary with the approval of the President."²¹

To implement these various responsibilities, both the combatant commander and Ambassador must map out responses for the various situations that might arise in their area of responsibility. The degree of planning is dependent on which category of OOTW being evaluated. Joint Pub 3-07 groups OOTW into four types: 1) insurgency and counterinsurgency; 2) terrorism; 3) peacekeeping; and 4) peacetime contingencies.²² These four classifications require a broad range of pre-planned responses.

The country team is responsible for preparing emergency action plans covering several subsets of these categories which have either been defined by law or assigned by the President. The combatant commander's missions are assigned by the President through the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP). From the JSCP, the CINC prepares operation plans (OPLANS) or concept plans (CONPLANS) for his assigned region.

While the Ambassador is most concerned with activities in his country, the CINC must maintain a broad perspective and plan across the range of his region. There is an area of intersection of responsibilities that




Figure 2 Intersection of organizational responsibilities.

require coordination, not only at the local level, but at all three organizational levels. As an example, staffs coordinate pre-planned emergency response activities at the CINC/country team level, and through a regional liaison group at the agency level. Country teams are required to update their plans on a quarterly basis and undergo an evaluation by a State Department assessment team every five years. The CINC's staff (J-5) plays a major roll in this effort.

Another interesting aspect of Title 22 and the Presidential letter is that the Ambassador is assigned responsibility for inter-agency coordination. Under Title 10, §164, no legal requirement is established for the commander to work with any agency outside the Department of Defense. Even under the Special Operating Forces responsibilities and authority (§167) there is no mandated condition for interagency unity of effort.

The Ambassador's requirement to coordinate is directed from Title 22 §2382:

"(b) The President shall prescribe appropriate procedures to assure coordination among representatives of the United States Government in each country, under the leadership of the Chief of the United States Diplomatic Mission."²³

The President's letter translates the Title 22 requirement into action with the following:

"You and such commanders must keep each other currently informed and cooperate on all matters of mutual interest. Any differences that cannot be resolved in the field should be reported by you to the Secretary of State; unified commanders should report to the Secretary of Defense."²⁴

The duties and responsibilities of the Ambassador and unified commander during OOTW are well defined by law and Presidential letter. In translating these assigned duties into actual plans, formal procedures exist to assist the country teams and CINC staffs in producing a well thought out and coherent plan. These formal planning and review methods ensure intra-organizational depth and inter-organizational breadth are integral to the plan.

Organizational Personality Types

The final barrier to unity of effort is common to everyday life; differences in personalities. This next section contrasts the organizational personalities of Defense and State.

Central to the comparison of State and Defense are the backgrounds and career paths of Foreign Service Officers (FSOs) and Military Officers (MOs); which, are remarkably similar. It is not surprising to discover that the Navy's officer system was

used as a model to develop the FSO personnel system.²⁵ Four common FSO/MO personnel system characteristics are:

- 1) a ranking/promotion system;
- 2) a regular evaluation system;
- 3) an up or out policy;
- 4) frequent rotation.

Elmer Plischke points out several similarities between these two systems in, United States Diplomats and Their Missions. FSOs, for example, have rank levels of 05 to 01 which are comparable to the military's 01 to 06. Also, the average duration of a FSO tour on station is 3.1 years; comparable to the average length of tour for a military officer.²⁶

To further highlight the similarities between typical career paths, both sets of officers go through a rigorous recruiting and entrance examination process. Once selected, they receive initial training and then are detailed to the field to gain experience and work toward developing a career specialty.

At about the five year point both groups confront their first major career milestone. Here, the FSO's performance is assessed and he is either retained or released. The junior military officer has completed his initial obligation and, based on performance, decides whether he has a future career.

Mid-grade officers receive further specialty training and then, through a pay-back tour, are given specialty assignments that also further develop their leadership skills. During this time, officers are rotated through the field, and for those who desire, a follow-on tour in Washington. In both organizations, Washington experience is essential for more senior advancement.

The next professional milestone is as a senior consulate advisor or the military equivalent 0-5/0-6 command tours. Following this, and with a lot of good luck, is senior diplomatic service or flag rank. Assignments at this level deal with policy formulation, budget planning, operational planning and execution, and personnel issues. The final milestone is the enviable Chief of Mission assignment or major operational command.

In comparing institutional personality types, I reviewed research conducted by Regis Walther in, Orientations and Behavioral Styles of Foreign Service Officers, and Naval War College Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI) information concerning

Table I Comparison of FSO and MO personality characteristics.

Area	Foreign Service Officer	Military Officer
Initial academic background	Tendency toward liberal arts	Tendency toward science and engineering
Problem solving techniques	More intuitive and impressionistic	More methodical and systematic
Working relations characterization	More through compromise and persuasion	More authoritative in nature
Working in formal organizations	More loosely defined, tendency toward individual effort	More clearly defined line of command, more formal

academic background, problem solving techniques, working relations techniques and ability to functioning within respective departments for FSOs and MOs. A "summation" of personality types for State and Defense is presented in Table I and may reveal why unity of effort is sometimes perceived as being less than optimum between the two Departments.

With this comparison, I applied the MBTI test in a similar fashion as Otto Kroeger has in, Type Talk, to asses the macroscopic personality types of the two organizations.²⁷

Foreign Service Officers were found to be more intuitive (N) in developing their perceptions. They were more likely to make their judgement based on feeling (F). Finally, they tended toward using more perceptive (P) attitudes when dealing with their environment.

In contrast, military officers were more likely to use their senses (S) in developing perceptions, while they tended to judge these perceptions based on thinking (T). Finally, they were attitudinally more judgmental (J) when dealing with the environment.

According to William Jefferies, CEO, Executive Strategies International, 70 percent of all military officers are introverts (I). Foreign Service Officers also tend to be more introverted (I), however, Jefferies commented that his confidence in the FSO assessment was low because of insufficient data.²⁸

Pulling these personality types together, State Department FSOs tend to be INFP type personalities and Defense Department

MOs are more likely to be ISTJ type. From Jefferies, this comparison suggests that the sensing MO develops perceptions through physical evidence, judges those perceptions in a methodical manner, and, most importantly, seeks an organized closure of the issue; as demonstrated in the first Joint Pub 3-Q's OOTW principle, objective - direct every military operation toward a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objective.²⁹ FSOs, on the other hand, form perceptions through symbology, judge these perceptions through reflection, and are adaptable in closure.

Type identifying an organization's personality by averaging the individual personalities of that organization is not always successful. According to Jefferies, a bureaucracy's "personality type" is not necessarily the sum of individual personality types that make up that organization. As was discussed at the beginning of this chapter, a bureaucracy's personality - as seen from an outside observer - is shaped by the leader who heads that organization. Individuals working within a bureaucracy, however, either conform to the sum of individual personality types making up that organization or risk being considered not part of the team.³⁰

With the idea that individuals tend to conform to their environment in order to maintain their sense of belonging, it follows that prior to reaching the first career milestone, the average junior FSO/MOs personality type is more in line with his/her academic background rather than those of the institution.

Isabel Briggs Myers, The Myers-Briggs Type Indicator, supplies further information on the correlation between academic background and personality types.³¹

Officers who clear the first milestone hurdle tend to do so because they fit in with the organization.³² As a result, the average personality type of the studied year group shifts toward the institutional average. As careers progress, institutional cultures more greatly influence officer attitudes, such that, by the FSO 02-01 and MO 05-06 level, there occurs a maximum divergence in personality type between the two departments. Beyond this point, senior diplomats and flag officers, as Ambassador Paul Taylor points out, must operate in value systems beyond their own organization, and actually begin to become more closely aligned in their view of the world.³³ Figure (3) captures the essence of this trend.




Figure 3 Personality Divergence

In the final assessment of personality types, Jefferies concludes that "Neither perceiving (P) nor judging (J) personalities, without training, is likely to appreciate the others attitudes toward closure," and, "The P-J relationship is quick to breed ill will and disharmony in organizations."³⁴

CHAPTER III CONCLUSION

Barriers to the Departments of Defense's and State's unity of effort have been reviewed through their organizational structure, assigned missions, and organizational personality types.

Much has already been accomplished over the last three decades to better couple the two organizations. The most sweeping changes occurred during the Rusk-McNamara years where the two departments enjoyed a strong working relationship through their respective Secretaries. During that time, Senator Jackson's desire to form a more "Central Partnership" between the Ambassador and other government agencies was realized. A renewed emphasis in unity of effort between Defense and State exists today. This revitalization is the necessary result of declining budgets and a new security environment.

Mission assignments have been clearly delineated through U.S. Code, Presidential Letters, and the JSCP. While the State Department has legal responsibilities to unify interdepartmental efforts, Defense commanders base their unity on doctrine which has been formalized through active memorandums of agreement between departments.

Differences in organizational personality types is the area shouldering the greatest potential for interrupting unity of effort. Sensing military officers require physical evidence to form their perceptions while intuitive FSOs are more likely to

rely on symbols to form theirs. Further, and most importantly, the judgmental (J) type MO has a desire for organized closure as compared to the perceiving (P) type FSO who is more adaptable to closure. The J-P relationship is the source of the greatest disharmony between the two organizations.

CHAPTER IV RECOMMENDATIONS

Admiral Paul David

Miller's comments are timely and on the mark - coordinate or be swept away.³⁵ He makes it clear, unity of effort is of primary importance.

Like a ball with a slow leak that constantly needs air, unity of effort needs constant attention to keep it inflated. To keep the State and Defense unity ball pumped up, both organizations must remain proactive and listen closely to what each other is saying. As an example, if State wants to know Defense's readiness to respond to a particular situation, they may ask a more sensory based question like, "What forces can you mobilize in four day?" instead of asking an intuitive type question such as, "How is your readiness?" To rephrase these questions takes an active understanding of how each department is organized and "thinks." Although improved inter-department awareness can be strengthened through an increase in cross-department links, the reality of declining budgets makes this unlikely. Instead, we should attempt to improve our ability to communicate directly through reliable and secure means. This may mean extra investment in video conferencing systems and computer networks.

Faced with the realities of our time, there are two essential lessons we should learn from the 20th century.

- First, a comprehensive strategy which blends diplomatic, economic, and military capabilities is the key to success.

- Second, the world is a dynamic place; nations and organizations that fail to recognize and adapt become irrelevant and swept away by the forces of change.

There is no magic pill that, if swallowed, will suddenly transform our organization to work with greater unity. We first should recognize each others strengths and take advantage of them through continued coordination and education.

ENDNOTES

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2. U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Doctrine for Joint Operations," Joint Pub 3-0, The Joint Staff, (Washington: September 1993), pp V-9 - V-16, defines operations other than war to include, but not limited to: a) arms control; b) combatting terrorism; c) DoD support to counterdrug operations; d) nation assistance - including security assistance and foreign internal defense; e) noncombat evacuation operations (NEO); f) other civil support operations; g) peace operations - including peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peace enforcement; and, h) support to insurgencies.
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